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ABSTRAK
Artikel ini menjelaskan tentang pelembagaan konflik melalui pelaksanaan otonomi 
khusus di Provinsi Aceh. Secara umum, salah satu tujuan implementasi kebijakan de-
sentralisasi asimetris di Aceh adalah sebagai langkah penyelesaian masalah integrasi 
nasional antara Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) dengan Pemerintah RI. Namun, pelak-
sanaan desentralisasi asimetris di Provinsi Aceh justru menunjukkan hal yang berbeda. 
Meskipun terdapat resolusi konflik di antara pihak GAM dan Pemerintah RI, dinamika 
konflik bersenjata di Aceh berubah menjadi konflik kepentingan antara elite GAM di 
tingkat lokal sebagai bagian dari dinamika politik elektoral. Artikel ini disusun mela-
lui studi literatur yang mengacu pada data sekunder untuk memahami proses politik 
elektoral sebagai saluran pelembagaan konflik pasca gerakan separatisme di Aceh. 
Artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa pemaknaan desentralisasi asimetris di Provinsi Aceh 
tidak hanya berfungsi sebagai resolusi konflik antara GAM dan Pemerintah RI. Di sisi 
lain, pelaksanaan otonomi khusus di Provinsi Aceh juga menjadi media pelembagaan 
konflik di antara elite eksponen GAM melalui pilkada (pemilihan kepala daerah) lang-
sung pada tahun 2006–2017.
Kata kunci: konflik, elite, GAM, otonomi khusus, pilkada.
ABSTRACT
This article explains an institutionalization of conflicts in the implementation of spe-
cial autonomy in Aceh Province. In general, one of the objectives of implementing the 
asymmetric decentralization policy is to resolve the problem of national integration 
between Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia. However, the 
implementation of asymmetric decentralization in Aceh Province presents a different 
phenomenon. Although there is conflict resolution between GAM and the Government 
of Indonesia, the conflict dynamics change into a conflict of interest between GAM 
elites at the local level as part of the dynamics of electoral politics. This article is based 
on a literature study on secondary data to understand the electoral politics process has 
evolved to be a medium for institutionalizing conflict after the separatism movement in 
Aceh. This article shows that the understanding of asymmetric decentralization in Aceh 
Province not only served as a solution to the conflict between GAM and the Indonesian 
Government but also became a medium for institutionalizing conflict between GAM’s 
elite exponents through local elections in 2006–2017. 
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INTRODUCTION
The special autonomy policy for Aceh Province does not guarantee that 
the governance process in Aceh will be free of conflicts at the local 
level1. At the national level, one of the conflicts in the mid-1970s in 
Aceh is the rise of GAM as a separatist movement bringing the issue 
of national integration in Indonesia. Reflecting on the long history of 
Aceh, the existence of GAM is part of accumulation of  Acehnese frus-
tration toward the way of Central Government  managing the natural 
resource since Orde Lama and Orde Baru (Aspinall 2007, 951). How-
ever, after decades of armed conflict, the two parties agreed to end the 
feud by signing the Helsinki Agreement, dating back to August 15, 2005. 
The agreement has ended the issue of national integration in Aceh, at 
least on paper.
The peace agreement is a proof that the issue of conflict in Aceh 
cannot be resolved through a military approach. Rather, the problem 
of national integration can be overcome through the democratization 
agenda, which refers to a control of the Acehnese civil elite to achieve 
peace (Hillman 2012, 149; Jemadu 2004, 315). One way to gain control 
over the Acehnese civil elites is the implementation of special autonomy 
through Law No. 11 of 2006 concerning the Government of Aceh. 
Through this legal instrument, several forms of special autonomy have 
been granted, including political, administrative, and fiscal rights2. In 
other words, Aceh’s Regional Government has extensive authority to 
independently solve many issues of the Acehnese people within the 
framework of Indonesian nation state.
However, despite the peace process that ends conflict and the special 
autonomy rights, elites in Aceh Province still deal with conflict among 
GAM exponents who have influence within society. After the Helsinki 
1 Implementation of special otonomy policy in Aceh was given by the Government of Indonesia 
as a solution to finish the problem of national integration since the existence of separatist move-
ment demanding independence in Aceh.
2 Aceh’s special autonomy based on Law No. 11 of 2006 concerning Aceh Government has 
provided a space for Aceh to have special rights including 1) the establishment of local political 
parties (political fields); 2) has the authority in several sectors such as fisheries, maritime affairs, 
trade, and investment (administrative sector); and 3) 70% of profit sharing in oil and gas mining 
and special autonomy funds.
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Agreement, the dynamics of the conflict changed from an armed ver-
tical conflict between GAM and the Government of Indonesia—with 
the aim of secession—to a weaponless horizontal conflict among fellow 
GAM exponents through regional elections (pilkada) in Aceh. The hori-
zontal conflict in this case was interpreted as a competition between 
GAM elite exponents, two of whom were the Governor and Deputy 
Governor, positions of Aceh Province to secure a place in the structural 
governance. Joining forces with local political parties, GAM exponents 
in Aceh played a significant role in the electoral politic process from 
2006 to 2017. Some of the political processes included the gubernato-
rial elections in 2006, 2012, and 2017. In other words, these conditions 
indicated that there was a transition of the role of GAM exponents who 
were initially in favor of separatist movements against the RI (Republic 
of Indonesia) government into a conflict of interest between internal 
elite exponents through democratic institutions.
Local political parties in Aceh provided a path for local elites to gain 
power in Aceh Province. In this case, GAM exponents such as Irwandi 
Yusuf, Muzakir Manaf, Zaini Abdullah, and Muhammad Nazar tried 
to realize the dreams of GAM without forming a separatist movement. 
Because of limited access to power resources after the armed conflict, 
GAM exponents were actively involved in various democratization 
agendas at the local level, particularly asymmetric decentralization poli-
cies in Aceh Province. In other words, the special autonomy policy in 
Aceh has become a medium for GAM exponents to fight for structural 
political positions in Aceh Province.
The asymmetric decentralization policy in Aceh can be seen as an 
initial step in overcoming the problem of national integration between 
GAM and the RI. Nevertheless, conflict at the local level in Aceh can-
not be resolved solely through the implementation of Law Number 
11 of 2006 concerning the Government of Aceh. In this regard, the 
implementation of special autonomy only acts as a medium of national 
integration to eliminate primordialist conflicts (Noor 2008, 98).
Previous studies have identified three approaches that highlighted a 
change in the dynamics of governance in Aceh after the implementa-
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tion of the Helsinki Agreement. The first one is that the institutionaliza-
tion of democracy at the local level between the central and regional 
actors was unbalanced, taking effect on the national integration process 
(Ufen 2007; Barter 2011; Törnquist 2011; Hillman 2012). Second, the 
implementation of democratization at the local level, which was not 
widespread in Aceh, was believed to be a result of the actors who were 
unable to adjust in asymmetric decentralization institutions, causing 
the implementation of privileges under the Helsinki Agreement to nega-
tively impact Aceh (Kingsbury 2007; Basyar 2008; Zainal 2015). The 
third approach proposes that there were two factors to solve the conflicts 
in Aceh, namely, power and profit sharing earned from the utilization 
of natural resources and ethnic problems in Aceh (Hartzell & Hoddie 
2003: Aspinall 2007, 2009; Wilson 2015).
However, previous studies have yet to explain in detail the choices 
of GAM elite exponents in fighting for the interests of post-armed con-
flict. This applies especially with regard to the choices of GAM elite 
exponents who can be eliminated in the electoral politic process, which 
certainly no longer employs the separatist approach as the way to reach 
their goals. On the other hand, even though special autonomy is grant-
ed as a means to overcome national integration problems, it also leads to 
uncertainty and competition among GAM elites when the mechanisms 
available for the distribution of political resources are only available 
through the electoral process. Competition between GAM elites being 
the only possible mechanism has created a space for institutionalizing 
competition among themselves through regional elections in Aceh. In 
other words, the asymmetrical decentralization policy became a space 
for competition between GAM exponent elites to fight for structural 
positions in Aceh Province after the Helsinki Agreement. To under-
stand these conditions, the author has a more elaborative question in 
this article: Why and how has the special autonomy policy turned into a 
medium for institutionalizing conflicts of interest in the form of competi-
tion between GAM elites in Aceh?
This article argues that conflict institutionalization in electoral poli-
tic occurs because of the role of GAM exponent elites who have chosen 
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the path of electoral politics as a means to achieve group interests that 
cannot be achieved through separatist movements. Democracy is not 
merely an institution of conflict, but the choice of GAM elites to sur-
render the political distribution of political resources through demo-
cratic mechanisms has made democracy itself an institution of conflict. 
GAM is no longer a single group when dealing with democracy, but it 
is divided into individuals who compete with each other. The change 
in orientation from political groups to individual politics is intriguing 
and calls for deeper discussion.
This article is based on literature studies using secondary data col-
lected from various results of previous studies. This article consists of 
a discussion that explains the GAM elite exponents who became local 
elites in Aceh. It also tries to explain the role of GAM elites in the pro-
cess of electoral politic between 2006 and 2017. The last section offers 
a discussion on local elections, which became a consensus among the 
elites of GAM exponents in Aceh.
THEORY R EV IEW
This paper uses conflict theory as the main analytical tool for under-
standing the conflicts that occurred in Aceh Province after the imple-
mentation of special autonomy. This paper reviews conflict theories 
developed since Clifford Geertz and Lewis A. Cosser as analytical tools. 
Gertz’s explanation on conflict is interesting to be used as a basis given 
the combination of primordial loyalty and political loyalty in a conflict 
between the political elites, which relates to the situation in Aceh. Ac-
cording to Gertz’s belief, a nation that has a variety of races, tribes, and 
religions can become sources of conflict for new countries (Rauf 2000, 
61). Among these diversities, every community has a tendency to gather 
around what is alike to them in the midst of diversity. In other words, 
society is seen as a group that is built on political loyalty and primordial 
loyalty in a country.
Geertz posited that political loyalty is relatively impermanent, but 
primordial loyalty is the nature of human beings that it is very strong 
and not easily shaken (Rauf 2000, 67). He assumes that there are three 
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important effects of combining political loyalty and primordial loyalty. 
First, the merging of the two loyalties results in a change in political 
loyalty (Rauf 2000, 68). Second, the combination causes both mixed 
political issues and primordial issues. Third, the incorporation of po-
litical demands and primordial demands results in the manipulation 
of primordial group support by political leaders for political interests 
(Rauf 2000, 69).
In Cosser’s view, the conflict creates a clear boundary between 
groups. The boundary is identified as an identity with a group to then 
be kept and protected from being fused with the boundaries of the sur-
rounding structures. In this case, Cosser considers that conflict is an 
instrumental process in the formation, unification, and maintenance of 
structures (Poloma 2007, 107). Cosser considers conflict as instrumental 
due to the formation of an identity that intersects with other identities. 
Instrumental is interpreted as a medium through which conflict forms 
and involving several parties. In this case, identity has the potential to 
produce an inter-group conflict (out-groups) that can strengthen the 
identity of group members (in-groups).
In addition to identity creation, Cosser believes that there is a mech-
anism that can channel the overflow of conflicts that occur between 
groups to eliminate the possibility of destruction of existing structures. 
In Cosser’s belief the the overflow of conflict can be detected by the 
relations and identities of the groups existing to get the interesting in 
the competition between the groups. Cosser refers to the mechanism as 
safety value (Poloma 2007, 108). In this paper, safety value is considered 
an identity in the form of values that trigger competition among actors 
after the resolution of separatist movements in Aceh Province.
In this paper, the author interprets primordial loyalty and political 
loyalty as a trigger for competition among actors involved in the elec-
tions in Aceh Province. The competition between GAM exponents 
that ensued after the enactment of Law No. 11 of 2006 concerning 
Aceh Government becomes the corpus of this paper. In addition to the 
cultural approach, the author uses a structural approach to understand 
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the consensus process that results in conflict resolution among local 
elite groups in Aceh Province.
In addition to the theory of conflict and consensus, this article also 
uses Vilvredo Pareto’s elite circulation theory analysis tool. In Pareto’s 
view, there is an interpretation of derivation that explains the existence 
of elite turnover not only based on numbers but also based on the ability 
of the elites who are able to survive and reach a higher position (Pareto 
1935, 1397–1420). In this case, Pareto mentions the concept of residue, 
which is interpreted as an emotional or irrational structure of human 
actions dominated by an illogical part of human actions (Permana 2017, 
15). Residue is seen as the main factor of the behavior of actors not only 
as trying to achieve a higher position but also as attempting to maintain 
the power they have.
According to Pareto, there are two divisions of residue. The first one 
is a combination of actions based on the ability to produce innovation, 
speculative activity, and acts of skepticism (Permana 2017, 15). This 
combination enables actors to make social changes carried out by the 
elites or to become a resource for elites when executing actions. The 
second is an action that tends to be conservative and dominated by a 
desire to maintain the status quo. In this case, it relates to elite actions to 
maintain political stability, national interests, and military activities. In 
other words, Pareto believes that the elites who want to maintain their 
power must be able to do a combination of the two residues.
He also believes that politicians are inspired to always be winners 
through the desire to obtain wealth, power, and appreciation (Pareto 
1935, 502). If the elites do not have the ability to regulate these matters, 
then they will be replaced by other elites. Therefore, Pareto then creates 
two categories of elites: Fox and Lion. For Pareto, the success of elites in 
managing power depends on the elite’s ability to utilize influence and 
power among the Foxes and Lions. In this article, elite theory becomes 
an analytical tool to understand the behavior of GAM elites who seek 
to achieve individual interests through access to special autonomy.
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R ESEA RCH METHODS
This article is based on a literature study of a collection of qualitative 
data including books, documents, online news, journals, and various 
written sources that are relevant to the problem of this research. This 
research only focuses on the conflict dynamics between GAM elite 
exponents who influenced institutions through the process of local elec-
tions as a form of elite circulations at the local level. The use of this 
approach aims to paint a specific picture of the dynamic competition 
between GAM elite exponents at the local level as a transitional form 
of the separatist movement conflict into competition in the regional 
elections in Aceh Province.
This study is focused on explaining the competition between GAM 
elite exponents in the Aceh Province, which occurred through a special 
autonomy policy, namely, the implementation of regional elections in 
Aceh. In addition, the special autonomy policy in Aceh is seen as a 
transitional phase from the armed conflict between GAM and the RI 
to competition among GAM elite exponents who interacted as political 
elites through regional elections in Aceh Province. In other words, this 
research is intended as a means to understand the dynamics of the elec-
toral politics as a medium for institutionalizing conflict in Indonesia.
GA M EX PONENTS AS POLITICA L ELITES IN ACEH
GAM is a form of many separatist movements that were initiated in 
Aceh. Separatist movements in Aceh are inseparable from the historical 
experience of Aceh as an area rich in diverse natural resources. Dur-
ing the era of President Soekarno, Aceh played an important role in 
national integration. Soekarno called Aceh Indonesia’s capital in the 
process of pioneering a unitary state amid a variety of primordialism 
spread throughout Indonesia (Pane 2001, 59–62).
Aceh as an area rich in natural resources, especially fossil gas, be-
came a region over which elites in Aceh fought to gain independent 
control of all forms of wealth for the sake of the people of Aceh. Ac-
cording to Sulaiman, the people of Aceh are divided into two economic 
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groups, 1) traditional agriculture and 2) large plantations—exploitation 
of forests and hydrocarbons and industry (Schulte Nordholt and van 
Klinken 2007, 307). The majority of Acehnese are traditional farmers, 
whereas the ruling groups are contractors who partnered with the cen-
tral government in the New Order era. The number of these contractors 
is in the thousands, and they are spread throughout the provincial and 
district levels (Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken 2007, 308). In other 
words, the middle class who had invested in the New Order era had at 
least contributed to creating an identity of capital control between local 
people and the group of contractors facilitated by the state in utilizing 
natural resources found in Aceh. The group of contractors as a middle 
class in Aceh had domination control to explore the natural resources. 
In my opinion, the control of natural resources by the contractors re-
sulte the identities on economic control between the elite of Aceh as 
local people giving the bass of movement to GAM and the political 
elites of Indonesian government.
In addition to the division of groups based on economic control, the 
political elites in Aceh comprised mostly clerics who controlled Aceh 
after the social revolution, which forced the Acehnese aristocrats to 
seek refuge in North Sumatra in the era of President Soekarno (Pane 
2001, 3–5). The emergence of ulama groups as part of the political elite 
in Aceh was inseparable from the social revolution that occurred in 
post-independence Sumatra. According to Reid (1979) and Sulaiman 
(1997), the aristocrats who had power over land were attacked by popu-
lar militias led by Teungku Daud Beureuh in 1946 (Schulte Nordholt 
and van Klinken 2007, 307). The absence of aristocratic roles in Aceh 
was then taken over by a group of scholars whose religious identity was 
well rooted in the history of Aceh. This is an example of how Acehnese 
people, who are very Islamic, value ethnic and religious bonds. Up 
until now, a variety of elite groups founded in Aceh were inseparable 
from the bonds of primordialism, which have created a strong bond in 
safeguarding the interests of the people of Aceh.
In addition to primordial bonds, the Acehnese who felt marginal-
ized because of policies set by the central government of the Old Order 
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and New Order regimes then supported separatist movements in Aceh. 
These movements emerged in various forms, eventually reaching their 
peak when GAM became a medium for long-lasting separatist move-
ments in Indonesia (Sulaiman 1997, 219). The striking difference due 
to GAM’s support of separatist movements in Aceh is that there are ori-
entation observers who initially emphasized religious values  to a more 
secular orientation. The secular orientation of GAM elite gives more 
medium for the elites of GAM to get attention from outsider to bring 
support of Aceh indepent. According to Aspinal, there was a change in 
ideological orientation due to the openness of the new elites who led 
the Aceh separatist movement and strategically sought international 
support for Aceh’s independence (Aspinall 2009b, 222).
The author identifies two bonds that are interwoven within Acehnese 
society, namely, primordial bonds and political bonds. Both reflect the 
emergence of loyalty to the traditions found in Aceh, namely, Islam, and 
political loyalty to the local elite, namely, the GAM exponents. These 
two loyalties grew in the era of democratization, even though they had 
to deal with the problem of national integration. Before the Helsinki 
Agreement3, GAM always spoke about both of these loyalties in various 
separatist activities. However, after the Helsinki Agreement, the GAM 
elite exponents competed with one another for structural positions, 
namely, the Governor and Deputy Governor of Aceh Province. With 
the Helsinki Agreement and the implementation of special autonomy 
for Aceh, there are two sources of conflict that have been resolved: 1) 
primordialism-based conflicts, such as elites’ idea of applying Islamic 
Shari’a, and 2) a new channel for the Aceh political elites to achieve 
their goals without the central government interfering in them. The 
two resolved sources of conflicts inspired GAM elite exponents to fight 
for their interests by local political parties to access power sharing in 
3 The Helsinki agreement enables the establishment of local political parties in Aceh, and this 
condition provides a wide range of opportunities for GAM through legal rules in the democratic 
system. One of them was reflected in the regional head election held on December 11, 2006. 
However, GAM was said to have failed to mobilize its elites in one local party. It is said that 
50% of GAM elites advanced as independent candidates at the district/city level (see Törnquist, 
Prasetyo and Birks 2010, 215).
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local elections as a right of asymmetrical decentralization implementa-
tion in Aceh, without the separatist movement but in the way of local 
democratization in Aceh.
Conflicts that turned into competition among elites still sparked 
contestation because of the loyalty of GAM exponents in Aceh. As 
Gertz posits, loyalty in society is the forerunner of the existence of con-
flicts in the community, the GAM exponent mantains the identities of 
GAM as the people struggling the right of local people of Aceh. In the 
electoral political process of Aceh, the conflict reflected in the separatist 
movement became a competition between GAM elites. In other words, 
conflicts relating to the problem of national integration can be resolved 
through asymmetric decentralization policies, but conflicts of interest 
in the form of competition stemming from the loyalty of the political 
elite can continue in the implementation of special autonomy for Aceh.
This condition is exhibited in the dominant role of GAM exponents, 
who turned into political elites over the control of local political parties. 
Therefore, what Gertz calls a combination of political demands and 
primordial demands results in the manipulation of primordial groups’ 
support by political leaders for their interests. In this case, the contesta-
tion process for regional head elections reflects the approach that GAM 
exponents use to manipulate the people to secure structural political 
positions in Aceh Province.
The implementation of special autonomy in Aceh provided a space 
for GAM elite exponents to manipulate primordial loyalty and politi-
cal loyalty through local political parties that were very influential in 
Aceh4. This can be seen in the legislative elections in Aceh where 
Aceh Party was able to gain a vote of 46.93% at the provincial level, 
and in some districts, it could secure a majority of 70% votes (Barter 
2011, 120–121). In this case, the primordial bonds that developed in the 
Acehnese society were institutionalized through local political parties. 
In addition, groups based on such bonds in Aceh did not occur after the 
4 After the enactment of Law No. 11 of 2006, all governors elected from 2007 to 2018 were 
GAM exponents who had roles in Local Political Parties, some of which were Irwandi Yusuf 
(Governor of Aceh 2007–2012 and 2017–2018), Zaini Abdullah (Aceh Governor 2012–2017), 
and Muzakir Manaf (Deputy Governor of Aceh for the period 2012–2015).
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Helsinki Agreement, due to the Law Number 11 of 2006 concerning 
Aceh’s government. Thus, the special autonomy policy implemented 
in Aceh can solve the problem of national integration originating from 
primordial bonds. On the other hand, the policy was able to provide a 
space for institutionalizing conflict in the form of competition among 
GAM elite exponents who contested regional elections to achieve their 
goals.
Conflicts of interest at the local level occurred after the Helsinki 
Agreement. GAM elite exponents who had strong influence within 
the community competed with each other to throne the Governor 
and Deputy Governor positions of Aceh Province in the 2006–2017 
elections. This condition was seen with the election of Irwandi Yusuf 
and Muhammad Nazar as the Governor and Deputy Governor for the 
period of 2007–2012. The two elected leaders were figures of GAM 
exponents who held important positions when separatist movements in 
Aceh were still happening. Irwandi Yusuf was a special staff member of 
the GAM Army Central Command, coordinator of the GAM negotia-
tor, and also chairman of the Nangroe Aceh Party Advisory Council, 
whereas Muhammad Nazar was the chairman of the Aceh Central 
Information Referendum Information Presidium and also Chair of the 
Independent Voice of Aceh Party (SIRA).
Table 1. GAM’s Figures as Political Elites in the Local Government of Aceh Province
No. Name Position in GAM Position in the Local Government
1 Irwandi Yusuf • Special Staff of GAM Central 
Army Command
• - Coordinator of GAM 
consultants
• - Governor of Aceh 2007–2012
• - Governor of Aceh 2015–2018
2 Muhammad Nazar • - Deputy Governor of Aceh 
2007–2012
3 Zaini Abdullah • - Minister of Health
• - GAM’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs
• - Governor of Aceh 2012–2017
4 Muzakir Manaf • - GAM’s commander • - Deputy Governor of Aceh 
2012–2017
Source: Taken and synthesized from various sources.
The success of GAM leaders in the 2006 local election illustrates 
that GAM had a role in maintaining peace after the Helsinki Agree-
ment. In addition, GAM’s victory through the Aceh Party in the 2009 
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elections highlighted that GAM played an important role in the po-
litical dynamics in Aceh. Without the role of its actors, peace would 
have been difficult to achieve (Törnquist, Prasetyo and Birks 2010, 
216). Within GAM itself, after the Helsinki Agreement, there were 
two factions fighting for power, namely, Kelompok Pro-demokrasi (Pro-
democracy Group) and Kelompok Muda (Group of the Youth), who still 
wanted to go on with the separatist movements (Törnquist, Prasetyo and 
Birks, 246). However, the majority of GAM elites believed that winning 
meant being involved in parliament.
In the next election in 2012, Irwandi Yusuf lost to Zaini Abdullah 
and Muzakir Manaf, who were elected Governor and Deputy Gover-
nor of Aceh Province for the period of 2012–2017. Zaini Abdullah was 
a GAM official who served as the Minister of Health and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of GAM, whereas Muzakir Manaf was a GAM Com-
mander and Chair of the Aceh Transitional Command who also served 
as General Chair of the Aceh Party. The elite transition illustrates that 
there was competition even between GAM exponents in taking the 
positions of Governor and Deputy Governor of Aceh Province.
In the 2017 election, Irwandi Yusuf won the election again as the 
Governor of Aceh Province after defeating the other candidates, who 
were also fellow GAM exponents. In this case, the transfer of power was 
again controlled by GAM exponents through the political process of 
direct regional elections. Although there was a democratic leadership 
shift in the political process in Aceh, conflicts occurred within the com-
munity at the grassroots level. One trigger for the power struggle in the 
middle of GAM exponents is the influence of the shift of GAM elites’ 
points of view in interpreting the struggle that GAM had endured as a 
separatist movement. One change that GAM executed was no longer 
prioritizing Islamic beliefs. Put more precisely, the struggle of GAM 
was a more secular struggle in terms of realizing justice for the people 
of Aceh through gaining independence to manage various resources 
in Aceh (Aspinall 2009b, 223) the secular struggle of GAM exponent 
presents new medium for accessing the support from Aceh people to 
win the regional election for governor candidates in Aceh.
18 JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 5, NO. 1, AUGUST 2019
On the other hand, the presence of GAM exponents as commu-
nity leaders in Aceh was inseparable from the rise of old-rooted and 
marginalized primordialism in Aceh. This always brings the idea that 
Aceh must have independence in managing its vast resources. This 
situation provided space for GAM exponents to become local elites 
who had a major influence in Aceh, although there was a competition 
within the group. Nonetheless, due to the primordial encouragement 
and the experience of GAM leaders in the separatist movement—per-
ceived as defending the interests of the Acehnese—special autonomy 
can be understood as GAM exponents in realizing the group’s ideals. 
In other words, the exponents of GAM played a big role in strengthen-
ing primordialism bonds and loyalty to former leaders of the separatist 
movement in Aceh.
This paper considers that special autonomy for Aceh not only is 
able to overcome the problem of national integration, the conflict of 
relations between GAM, and the RI but also becomes a medium for 
the competition of local elites who are former GAM exponents. In 
this regard, the agenda of democratization at the local level, through 
regional head elections and the role of local political parties in Aceh, 
became the most important way to manage conflict. In this case, the 
special autonomy policy—local political parties can participate the lo-
kal election in Aceh—was a determinant of the ongoing circulation of 
the GAM elite exponents after the Helsinki Agreement. Therefore, it 
is necessary to interpret the role of local political parties in the process 
of local democratization, which contains exponents of separatist move-
ments that influence the dynamics of the implementation of special 
autonomy in Aceh.
LOCA L ELECTIONS IN 2006,  2012 ,  & 2017
Local political parties in Aceh provided space for GAM elite members 
to be directly involved in fighting for primordial interests after the end 
of armed conflict between GAM and the Indonesian Government. One 
form of interest is the process of mastering the government structure by 
GAM exponents in independently managing the government in Aceh 
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Province. During the election of the Governor and Deputy Governor of 
Aceh Province, local political parties in Aceh became a tool for GAM 
exponents to gain power through the local election. This can be seen 
with the role of several local political parties in Aceh. Some of them 
have influence, namely, Aceh Party, SIRA Party, Nangroe Aceh Party, 
and Aceh Regional Party. In other words, local political parties in Aceh 
are a reflection of the channel through which GAM exponents gain 
power in Aceh.
The presence of local parties in Aceh is part of conflict institution-
alization, according to the Helsinki Agreement. Local parties in Aceh 
did not exist as a form of Aceh’s elite exponent unit sought to fight for 
independence for Aceh. In this case, GAM diaspora groups comprised 
senior elites with different views in managing post-conflict Aceh. Ac-
cording to Missbach (2011), the conflict in Aceh persisted because of 
the emergence of Acehnese diaspora that had long lived abroad in Aceh 
to continue the struggle for influence through different ways. This 
condition gave rise to differences of opinion between the senior elite 
(diaspora) and junior GAM (local elite groups in the area) in responding 
to the political dynamics after the conflict in Aceh.
Differences in factions among GAM elites show that an identity 
formed between the elites after the Helsinki Agreement. In this case, 
Cosser (in Poloma 2007) considers that every identity has the potential 
to generate potential inter-group conflicts (out-groups) that can strength-
en the identity of group members (in-groups). The condition is seen in 
the group differences between senior elites and GAM’s junior elites in 
response to political contestation in Aceh. This condition arose from 
the defeat of candidates proposed by the GAM diaspora by the GAM 
elite in Aceh, as is Missbach’s view (2011):
For example, during the gubernatorial election in December 2006, 
the winners were not the two candidates, Humam Hamid and Hasbi 
Abdullah, who had been proposed and endorsed by the GAM leaders in 
Sweden. It was Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar, two prominent 
young figures from GAM and SIRA, the organization that had been 
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pushing for a public referendum in Aceh, who won the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of the Acehnese electorate. (Missbach 2011, 190)
Table 2. Results of Aceh’s 2006 General Election of the Governor and Deputy Governor
No. Candidates Votes Percentage Political Party/Affiliation
1 Irwandi Yusuf–Muhammad Nazar 768,745 38.2% Independent
2 Ahmad Humam Hamid–Hasbi 
Abdullah
334,484 16.6% PPP
3 Malik Raden–Sayed Fuad Zakaria 281,174 13.9% Golkar, PDIP, and small 
party coalition
4 Azwar Abubakar–Nasir Djamil 213,566 10.6% PAN, PKS
5 Ghazali Abbas Adan–Shalahuddin 
Alfata
156,978 7.8% Independent
6 Iskandar Hoesin–Saleh Manaf 111,553 5.5% Small party coalition
7 Tamlicha Ali–Harmen Nuriqamar 8,.327 3.9% Small party coalition
8 Muhammad Djali Yusuf–Syauqas 
Rahmatillah
65,543 3.2% Independent
Source: Mietzner 2007.
The victory of Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar exposed the com-
petition between GAM’s elite exponents in Aceh. The struggle for the 
top position in the governance structure in Aceh by GAM exponents 
gave birth to a different and stronger identity in the asymmetric decen-
tralization policy in Aceh. This condition was inseparable from change 
undertaken by GAM elites in achieving GAM’s ideals. Post 1998, some 
groups chose to continue to support the separatist movement as a me-
dium for achieving independence, but there were other fractions that 
wanted to use the pro-democracy movement as a channel to achieve 
the goals of GAM elites. In other words, the conflict of interest found 
in internal GAM became kindling for competition between GAM elites 
during local election in 2006. By the local election in 2006 the GAM 
exponents success became a lokal political elite as Governor of Aceh 
Province.
In the 2012 elections, competition between GAM exponents be-
came increasingly apparent with the competing candidates for Gov-
ernor and Deputy Governor positions coming from GAM elites. Both 
pairs represent the identity of the old and young groups in electoral 
politics in Aceh. The success of Zaini Abdullah and Muzakkir Manaf 
in the 2012 elections showed that there was support from the senior 
group, represented by Zaini Abdullah, and Muzakkir Manaf from the 
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junior group, who were both with the Aceh Party to strive for structural 
positions in the Aceh governance.
Table 3. Results of Aceh’s 2012 General Election of the Governor and Deputy Governor
No. Candidates Votes Percentage Political Party/Affiliation
1 Ahmad Tajuddin–Teuku 
Suriansyah
79,330 3.33% Independent
2 Irwandi Yusuf–Muhyan Yunan 694,515 29.18% Independent
3 Darni M. Daud–Ahmad Fauzi 96,767 4.07% Independent
4 Muhammad Nazar–Nova 
Iriansyah
182,079 7.65% Demokrat Party, PPP, 
SIRA Party
5 Zaini Abdullah–Muzakir Manaf 1,327,695 55.75% Aceh Party
Source: Taken and synthesized from KIP Aceh (2007)
The victory of the senior and junior groups of GAM exponents, Zaini 
Abdullah as a senior elite of GAM and Muzakir Manaf as a junior 
elite of GAM, was proof that GAM elites who had influence among 
the Acehnese people could yield significant voting power. The power 
relation established between GAM exponents and primordialists—reli-
gion and ethnicity—in Aceh was the main factor in the victory of GAM 
members as a form of cooperation between GAM exponents to compete 
with other GAM members through regional elections.
The 2017 regional election still showcased the contestation among 
GAM exponents through the electoral political agenda in Aceh. The 
victory of Irwandi Yusuf and Nova Iriansyah is proof that the elite cir-
culation in Aceh Province revolved between GAM exponents through 
direct elections. Pareto (1935) argues that the success of elites in man-
aging power depends on the ability of the elite to use influence and 
power among the elite group that is contained in a different identity, 
insider and the outsider of GAM exponent in the case of local election 
Aceh. The success of Irwandi Yusuf, as a GAM exponent who was able 
to defeat Muzakir Manaf, was an elite transition that could be achieved 
by exponents who were able to integrate with the GAM non-exponent 
group. In this case, Irwandi Yusuf represented the community groups 
outside GAM as well as parts of GAM itself.
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Table 4. Results of Aceh’s 2017 General Election of the Governor and Deputy Governor
No. Candidates Votes Percentage Political Party/Affiliation
1 Tarmizi A. Karim–
T. Machsalmina Ali
406,865 16.9% Golkar, Nasdem
2 Zakaria Saman–T. Alaidinsyah 132,981 5.5% Independent
3 Abdullah Puteh–Sayed Mustafa 
Usab Al-Idroes
41,908 1.7% Independent
4 Zaini Abdullah–Nasaruddin 167,910 6.9% Independent
5 Muzakir Manaf–T. A. Khalid 766,427 31.8% Aceh Party, PPP, 
Gerindra, PBB, PKS, PAN
6 Irwandi Yusuf–Nova Iriansyah 898,710 37.2% Demokrat, PKB, PDIP, 
PNA, PDA
Source: Taken and synthesized from KIP Aceh (2007)
The success from Irwandi Yusuf’s re-election continued, as GAM expo-
nent maintained office throughout the three election periods, namely, 
2006, 2012, and 2017. The victory of GAM exponents in Aceh in the 
electoral politic agenda as regional heads reflected that local elites with 
non-GAM backgrounds were still unable to represent Aceh. I argue 
that GAM exponent elites are elite local groups adjusting themselves 
through the identities of GAM struggling the right of Aceh people with-
out separatist movement after the Helsinki Agreement to create a space 
to legitimize the interests of GAM elites that cannot be achieved before 
the peace treaty between GAM and the Government of Indonesia.
With GAM exponents claiming victory as Governor and Deputy 
Governor of Aceh, the central government greatly benefited because the 
conflict of interest was localized among GAM exponents due to there 
is no separatist movement after Helsinki Agreement. However, the con-
flict did not reflect which occurred before the Helsinki Agreement. The 
asymmetrical decentralization policy in Aceh provided room for insti-
tutionalization of the conflict by local democratization mechanisms in-
volving GAM Elites as actors dominating the electoral politic process in 
Aceh. Therefore, the process of implementing electoral politic through 
the role of local political parties in Aceh became a perfect medium for 
institutionalizing conflict in the form of competition among GAM 
exponent elites, which continued to be reflected in the local elections 
in 2006, 2012, and 2017 at the provincial level.
23ASYMMETRIC DECENTRALIZATION IN ACEH
LOCA L ELECTIONS AS CH A NNEL TO CONSENSUS
During the conflict between GAM and RI in 1976–2005, it was esti-
mated that 9,000 people were killed (Turner 2007, 96). This condition 
was further aggravated by the earthquake and tsunami that struck Aceh 
in 2004. There was no other choice for GAM and the RI than to sign 
a peace treaty to solve the problems in Aceh. In the hard times, the 
Helsinki Agreement came as a conflict resolution that was agreed by 
both parties, GAM and the RI. On the other hand, the treaty created 
an isolated space of conflict at the regional level, because the contesta-
tion was no longer between GAM and RI. Thus, the parties involved, 
after the Helsinki Agreement, were GAM exponents who had major 
influence within the Acehnese community.
The special autonomy policy applied in Aceh not only was given as 
a gift for Aceh’s wealth as an area that has abundant resources but also 
emphasized a form of electoral politic implementation after the armed 
conflict between GAM and RI. This condition, as posited by Olle 
Törnquist, helped Aceh’s democratization, which took place through 
institutional strengthening based on power sharing through the rela-
tion between group participation and representation in Aceh (Törnquist 
2011, 823).
Before the Helsinki Agreement, the parties involved in the conflict 
were elites from the GAM and RI groups. After the signing of the treaty, 
the GAM exponents who tried to further their interests through the 
political process explained in Law No. 11 of 2006 concerning the Aceh 
Government became local elites involved in the conflict of interest to 
achive political position in Government of Aceh Province. In other 
words, the presence of special autonomy in Aceh can be considered as 
contributing to the institutionalization of conflicts of interest through 
the electoral politics agenda after the Helsinki Agreement.
Rauf sees an election process as the basis for conflict and political 
consensus, as well as a way out of conflict that occurs between contes-
tants who fight for political positions (Rauf 2000, 36). In connection 
with this view, the involvement of Aceh’s local political parties is an 
extraordinary right for GAM’s elites and the right presents a medium of 
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conflict of interest in the form of competition between the elite of the 
GAM exponents as a process to reach political consensus in Aceh. In 
other words, the competition and victory among elite GAM exponents 
in local elections was a transition from a separatist movement to a con-
flict of interest among internal elite exponents of separatist movements 
who believed in national integration5.
In addition, the change in the role of the GAM elite exponents as 
the Governor and Deputy Governor of Aceh revealed an elite circula-
tion process that occurred within the GAM exponents’ circle. In this 
case, elites show themselves as actors who play an important role in a 
structure. From Pareto’s point of view, the elites in this case are con-
sidered Foxes, that is, elites who are able to balance power depending 
on how well they can utilize their influence and power among groups 
of actors.
In this case, GAM elite exponents experience a change in how they 
achieve their goals. GAM elites are proof that there are two changes in 
the orientation, namely, 1) a change in the conservative way of thinking 
and 2) a shift in how to achieve goals. The first change was reflected 
through an elite orientation that did not prioritize the idea of apply-
ing Islamic Shari’a, being secular, and also making adjustments to the 
political process of democracy that was carried out together regardless 
of faith. This condition is seen in GAM as an organization that uses 
Islam doctrine, the struggle of implementation of shari’a in Aceh, as a 
basic value in its struggle to achieve its interests. However, within the 
membership hierarchy, there is an opposing idea of  the establishment 
of an Islamic state and the application of the Shari’a law (Kingsbury 
2007, 165).
Second, the shift in how to achieve goals was practiced through 
the local elections. On the basis of this case, it can be said that GAM 
exponents Irwandi Yusuf, Zaini Abdullah, and Muzakir Manaf are 
elites regarded as Foxes. The author believes that elites, who tend to be 
5 Lewis Coser believes that conflict has positive and negative functions. In this case, conflict 
and consensus in Rauf ’s view have similarities, which are to create positive functions—integra-
tion (see Dahrendorf 1994, 256).
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regarded as Foxes, have the ability to adjust themselves more quickly, 
even in competitive conflicts, through the political process of democ-
racy. This condition reinforces the view that the mechanism of regional 
head elections can be a medium for conflict resolution among elite 
exponents who fight their way for structural positions in Aceh Prov-
ince. Thus, special autonomy applied in Aceh catered to the conflict 
between local elites. However, as most characters of the local elites in 
Aceh were perceived as Foxes, negotiations in resolving conflicts are 
possible. Therefore, special autonomy can be both a source of conflicts 
and consensus in Aceh.
CONCLUSIONS
Asymmetric decentralization in Aceh Province has been heralded with 
resolving conflict between GAM and the Government of Indonesia. 
On the other hand, the implementation of special autonomy has also 
created a new space that reflects the institutionalization of conflicts of 
interest among GAM’s elite members in Aceh. In other words, GAM 
elite exponents have participated in the electoral democratization in 
Aceh Province without using any means of the separatist movement. 
GAM elite exponents involved in the struggle for power structures in 
Aceh Province have experienced adjustments in the mechanism of 
democracy. This adjustment can be seen through the orientation of 
GAM elites who abandoned conservative methods and separatism in 
achieving their goals.
Nonetheless, the competition among GAM elites has also proven 
the existence of political loyalties affecting the Acehnese people, which 
is different from the primordialism bonds that were much developing 
in the separatist movement era. The behavioral adjustment of GAM 
elite exponents provided room for an elite circulation, which stayed 
in effect among the elite GAM exponents during 2006–2017. On the 
other hand, the agenda of electoral politic in Aceh led to new competi-
tions among the local political elite in Aceh. This condition is seen as 
an expansion of the role of local elites, GAM exponents, who have a 
broad influence in the community after the Helsinki Agreement. This 
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condition made GAM elite exponents choose the path of electoral de-
mocratization as a medium for competition. Therefore, electoral politic 
in the form of regional head elections in Aceh Province illustrates the 
institutionalization of conflict, which allowed old elites to adapt to the 
local democratic mechanism in Aceh.
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